



THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM ON THE DISPLACED PERSONS IN CAMEROON, 2009-2017

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Abstract

The paper examines the consequences of Boko Haram terrorism on the displaced persons in Cameroon. In an attempt to analyse the repercussions of the sect, we perused the reasons for its extension to Cameroon, recruitment of its membership, philosophy, effects on the displaced, attempted solutions and proposals to obliterate the sect. Our results benefited from primary, secondary and tertiary sources of data interpreted with the mixed research methodologies. The paper concludes that although Boko Haram succeeded in imposing incredible consequences on the displaced persons, its dream of an Islamic State was by far a myth. It argues that although the wings of the sect were clipped, it remains a major threat and challenge to the government. To absolutely eliminate Boko Haram, the government should: embark on new policy formulation, heavy developmental projects, capacity development of the youth, civic education, strengthen collective action of the Lake Chad Basin Countries, more African Union forces and concerted global cooperation as a sustainable therapy.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Government, Displaced Persons, Consequences, Therapy

Résumé

L'étude examine les conséquences de terrorisme de Boko Haram sur les personnes déplacées au Cameroun. L'évaluation des conséquences de la secte sur les déplacées ont permis d'examiner la raison d'être de son extension au Cameroun, le recrutement des membres, sa philosophie, ses conséquences sur les personnes déplacées, les tentatives de solution et les propositions pour complètement éliminer la secte. Les résultats de cette réflexion proviennent des sources primaire, secondaire et tertiaire qui ont été analysé avec les méthodes de recherche mélangé. L'étude conclut qu'en dépit de la réussite de Boko Haram par l'imposition d'horribles conséquences aux personnes déplacées, son rêve de la création d'un Etat islamique demeure un mythe. Bien que les ailes de Boko Haram aient été brisées, elle reste une menace majeure et un défi pour le gouvernement. Pour éliminer Boko Haram, le gouvernement devra : formuler une nouvelle politique, réaliser des grands projets de développement, accorder une place important au développement de la jeunesse, mettre l'accent sur l'éducation civique, soutenir l'action collective des pays du Bassin du lac Tchad et la force de l'Union Africaine et mettre un accent particulier sur la coopération sous régional, régional et internationale comme thérapie viable.

Mots clés : Boko Haram, Gouvernement, personnes déplacées, conséquences, thérapie.

Introduction

Since the start of the 21st century, the world has suffered from an increase in extremists attacks most often purportedly associated to the Islamic religion. The continent of Africa has so far not been different especially with the terrorists' attacks notably by Al Shabab, AL Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram. Amidst the terrific activities of these organisations, Cameroon singled out itself from the instabilities on the continent and served as an island of peace. The country was then nicknamed Africa in miniature and regarded as a safe haven¹ to forced displaced persons from turbulent African countries. Such an envious status of Cameroon could not be jealously preserved lately due to political instabilities and terrorism in the neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). Such an unavoidable cancer of terrorism in the region did not spare Cameroon of its long history of serenity as it contracted the virus and became the theatre for extremists operations. At this juncture, our study therefore investigates the reasons for the sudden transformation of a peaceful Cameroon to a war-ravaged-zone. The central problem scrutinised here is: why the extension of Boko Haram to Cameroon and what were its aftermaths on the displaced persons? To answer this question, the paper focuses on the grounds for the extension of Boko Haram terrorism to Cameroon, its consequences on the displaced and puts forward a therapy to the malaise. But just what is the driving force or ideology of the sect is a must answered interrogation.

Meaning and Philosophy of Boko Haram

The sect's official name in Arabic is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*. Literally, the Arabic translation of the name means that "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's 'Mohammed' Teachings and Jihad".² The appellation, Boko Haram is the local

¹ (Safe haven, Island of peace and paradise) are all terminologies which depict and describes Cameroon as a very peaceful country in a turbulent Africa. The historical application of such terms attest to the fact that Cameroon has not experience any war as was the case in most African countries during the liberation struggle from the colonialists and the post-independence wars that were very common in Africa. The country's political stability (absence of war) justified why it was an attraction, home or direction to most refugees in the world and Africa in particularly.

² Adagba Okpaga, *et al*, "Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria" Vol. 1, No.9; *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, OMAN Chapter, April 2012, p. 83., Chukwuma Okoli *et al*, "Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency", *Global Journal of Human-Social Science*, Vol. XIV, Issue I, Version 1.0, 2014, pp.38-50, p.43., available at www.ijhssnet.com, accessed on the 9th November 2014

dubbing of the sect by residents of Maiduguri when Utaz Yusuf came to the helm of the sect in 2002. Boko Haram according to the local Hausa language is translated as Western education is forbidden or is a sin. The inhabitants gave the group this name because of its strong aversion to Western education which it viewed as corrupting Muslims. The name Boko Haram is derived from the Hausa word *boko* which means animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education, while *haram* is a word with Arabic origin that figuratively means sin but literally means forbidden.³

Ideologically, Boko Haram opposes both Western culture and modern science. In an interview conducted by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) with Yusuf in 2009, he declared that the belief that the world is spherical in shape is a sharp contradiction to Islamic thought and therefore should be rejected along with Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by the sun. The certified name only remains on paper as Boko Haram has become the internationally recognised name of the sect. It therefore becomes very essential to understand how and why the sudden drift from the original name of the sect.

Adagba posits that the sect earned its nickname from the teachings of its leader (Mohammed Yusuf) in the early 2000s in the restive north-eastern city of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. According to this, Yusuf argued that Western education known in Arabic as *boko* brought nothing but poverty and suffering to the region and should therefore be forbidden or *haram* in Arabic.⁴ Yusuf however started preaching peacefully and speedily gained a large following among the disillusioned youth in the region. Of course, Yusuf's continuous preaching and the activities of the sect gave it a global appellation of Boko Haram. Although the sect has transmuted under various names like the Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban,⁵ what remains common in international daily usage is Boko Haram.

The name Boko Haram has also become a barrier to people's understandings of the group's motives. It is employed throughout this paper only because it is shorter and better

³ Samuel Asuquo Ekanem *et al*, "Boko Haram and Amnesty: A Philo-Legal Appraisal" *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 2 No. 4, Special Issue – February 2012, p.232., available at www.ijhssnet.com, accessed on the 9th November 2014.

⁴ Samuel, "Boko Haram and Amnesty..." 2012, p.232.

⁵ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies* 29 February 2012, p.2. available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/> accessed Friday 30th September 2016.

understood than its official name (*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*). Boko Haram was a name given to the group by dismissive neighbours who did not join the sect and had no time for it. Interestingly, the sect does not absolutely reject the modern science. The group's use of mobile phones, video cameras, videos, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits members.

However, the sect is against those in northern Nigeria known as *yan boko*. Yan boko is literally translated as child of the book. It refers to the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonise Nigeria, the people who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be *yan boko* is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim *umma* (community).⁶

It is worthless going further to state that it is a sharp contradiction as the name does not have anything in common with the aim of the sect. If Western education must be forbidden as Yusuf preached, then the sect must have lost its credibility, meaning, *raison d'être* and focus. This is justified in that; it uses other languages such as English to circulate its messages, the internet, telephone, radio, television, automation, cyclists, guns and heavy artillery to hit its targets. If Western education has to be forbidden as claimed by the sect, it must refrain from the usage of the above and create a new world order of its own. In as long as the sect cannot reorder the planet, it should not only change the name but, give off the struggle completely.

Goal and Objectives

The fundamental purpose of the sect was to overthrow the Federal Government of Nigeria and establish an Islamic state free of Western education. The aim was supported by a series of objectives developed subsequently. Among the poorer parts of Nigeria, the north lacked infrastructure and reliable power. Since the end of military rule, much of the region felt excluded from the system of patronage that fuelled Nigerian politics. Boko Haram was used as a political tool by northern politicians to pressure the Nigerian Federal government to satisfy their demands. The use of pressure is a photocopy of the same formula the

⁶ Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram?", *United States Institute of Peace*, (Special Report 308), June 2012,p.7. available at www.usip.org, downloaded on the 25th November 2014.

politicians from the Niger Delta used militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta to get their fair share of the Nigeria's oil revenue.⁷

Also, Boko Haram leaders cited Yusuf's death as one of the main factors driving the insurgency. This objective presupposes that the sect's members were bent on socking the blood of military personnel and their sympathisers as payment for the killing of their leader Yusuf. This claim is by far fallacious because Yusuf was even the leader who intensified extremism in the sect when he took over its leadership. For instance, in 2004 the group moved to Kanamma in Yobe State where a base was established and named Afghanistan from which attacks were launched at nearby police outposts and several police officers killed. Its leader Yusuf was very hostile to democracy and the secular educational system".⁸ This shows that radicalism was an old practice of the sect and should not have been a justifiable reason for its terrorism.

Besides, the eradication of Western education and culture was another objective of the sect. This was influenced by the Quran's phrase that says "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors."⁹ Boko Haram therefore promoted this version of Islam that makes it *haram* for Muslims to participate in any activity associated with Western society. These activities that are *haramed* includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving secular education. To the sect, Nigerian is ruled by non-believers. Since the Sokoto caliphate that ruled parts of northern Nigeria, Niger and Southern Cameroon fell under British control in 1903, there was a strong aversion to Western education by Muslims in the area.

Several Muslim families influenced by the elite who do not value education as a priority even refused to send their children to government run Western schools. It is based on this philosophy that the Muslim cleric (Mohammed Yusuf), took over Boko Haram in Maiduguri in 2002. He established a religious complex that included a mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries enrolled their children in the school.

The main goal of Boko was to create an Islamic state and the school was a recruiting ground and centre for Jihads to fight the Federal government of Nigeria.¹⁰ Such an objective

⁷ Adagba, *et al*, "Activities of Boko...", 2012, p.85.,

⁸ Andrew, "What is Boko...?", 2012, p.1.(16p

⁹ Samuel *et al*, " Boko Haram and Amnesty...", 2012, p.233.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 233.

is not far from madness and unrealistic because Boko still relied on Western education and science to propagate its stance, operations and teachings. Borrowing from each culture is a universal practice which is as old as humankind. Rather Boko Haram should develop new technology that can move the world forward than hide in the dark and suck the blood of innocent people in the name of religion. If there is any religion that does not promote human welfare and instead kills, then it certainly cannot receive God's benediction and should by every means possible be completely obliterated from the human planet.

In addition, *Shariah* law was another factor that Boko emphasised on its forced imposition facilitated through rigidly gendered ideology. The rise of Boko coincided with the adoption of *Shariah* in 12 northern states and was to some extent a by-product of this. The version of *Shariah* supported the sect promotes narrow gender roles for men and women, strict rules on women's dress and sexual conduct.¹¹ These range from the enforced segregation of school children and public whipping of women for fornication. Gendered norms adopted by the sect to be opposed are "the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexuals, lesbianism, rape of infants, blue films, prostitution, and beauty pageants all associated with Western ideals".¹²

The prosecution of military officials and unconditional release of sect members were underlined demands of the sect from the government. The sect emerged around 2002 in north-east Nigeria causing increasing concern to the authorities. In summer 2009, major violence erupted in Maiduguri where it was well planted. The Federal authorities after some hesitation responded with massive force. In July 2009, the mosque headquarters of Mohammed Yusuf in the city of Maiduguri was destroyed in an assault by the military. Many hundreds were killed and Mohammed Yusuf was arrested and shot dead while in captivity.

Since the incident, the sect included in their agenda the prosecution of the military they claimed were responsible for the killing of Yusuf. They also included the release of all members imprisoned and the full implementation of *Sharriah* law in the twelve northern

¹¹ Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, "Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram", *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Vol.5 Issue 1 (Special Issue), February 2014, p. 51., <http://www.wsj.com/articles/accessed Friday 30th September 2016>.

¹² Farouk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists" 11 January 2012, p.1,3., downloaded on <http://www.wsj.com/articles/accessed Friday 30th September 2016>.

states of Nigeria.¹³ Such non-conforming extremists' demands were contradictory to any conventional government and could definitely not be granted by the government of Nigeria. At this juncture it is interesting to find out who the members were and how they were recruited.

Membership

The exact number of its members is not known although it drew followers across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Sudan. Its members were mainly recruited among the disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and *Almajiris* (Street Children otherwise known as beggars). *Almajiri* is a popular old practice whereby children were sent to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in Northern Nigerian and Cameroon. The *Almajiris* lived in very appalling conditions thereby becoming vulnerable to recruitment by Boko Haram largely through indoctrination. Freedom maintains that as of 2010, Nigeria hosted about 9.5 million street children with over 80 per cent concentrated in northern Nigeria.¹⁴

Besides, the sect's members were well-educated, wealthy and influential people such as university lecturers, business contractors and politicians who were the major financiers.¹⁵ It should be added here that the sect also had some foreign members. This is so because the nature of arms, ammunitions and intelligence used by the sect could not have been only of African making thus suggesting that it had some members from the West. Although, there are allegations that the members received training in neighbouring turbulent countries like Niger, Mali and manufactured local explosives, they were still insufficient to instil threat to the army. Thus; there must have been an external support to challenge the army. This support could not come from any other place in the planet but from the West. This point is supported by the hypothesis that:

Les amis du Nigérien ne sont pas ceux qui, par une communication surfait, proposent leur aide pour lutter contre la secte islamise. Il s'agit plutôt d'embarrasser l'ennemi nigérien pour mieux l'étouffer ! Premier pays producteur de pétrole en Afrique et sixième mondial avec 2,5 millions de barils par jour, le Nigeria a commis le crime de céder des puits de pétrole à la Chine. Une concurrence jugée insupportable pour les

¹³ Paul Rogers, "Nigeria: The Generic Context of The Boko Haram Violence", Oxford Research Group, 30 April 2012, p.1 (5p.) retrieved on, www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk, 13th October 2015.

¹⁴ Freedom, "Boko Haram..." 2012, pp.2-3.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp.2-3

USA, la France et l'Angleterre qui pompent le pétrole nigérien sans inquiétudes depuis 50 ans. De leur cote, les pétromonarchies arabes s'inquiètent d'un Nigeria trop puissant qui pourra ne plus se soumettre au diktat de l'Arabie Saoudite et du Qatar sur le marché du pétrole et du gaz. A l'image de l'Iran (2eme) et du Venezuela (5eme producteur de pétrole mondial) qui gèrent leur pétrole en toute souveraineté. Boko Haram est le cheval de Troie qu'utilisent les puissances impérialistes pour contrer la Chine et détruire la première puissance économique africaine qu'est devenu le Nigeria en le divisant en deux états comme au Soudan.¹⁶

From the above citation, it would appear that Boko terrorism is a fabrication of the Western countries notably: the USA, Britain and France. Although, they might not have founded the sect; they purportedly took advantage to use it as a potential organisation to destabilise Nigeria/Cameroon and off root China from the Gulf of Guinea. Of course, petrol remains at the epicentre of world economy driven by capitalism and could not for any reason be left in the hands of communist China a recent arrival on the continent. The West also see themselves as the makers of the present day Africa and would not give way for communists to reap the fruits of colonialism. These claims are substantiated by the fact that the West has been responsible for many conflicts and wars in the world and most particularly Africa.

For example, the aggression and destruction of Libya in 2011¹⁷ by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was simply a nostalgia of 1949 in which the Libyan guide Muammar Gaddafi nationalised the Giant Exon Oil Mobile owned by Britain and the USA and forced them out of Libya. Equally, Nicholas Sarkozy wanted to punish the Libyan leader for declaring to the world that he sponsored his campaign during the French presidential. This declaration soared their relations such that Gaddafi's visit and buying of French arms in December 2007 was interpreted a ploy to later aggress him.¹⁸

Besides, the world witnessed the involvement of the West in petroleum conflicts in Venezeula, Iraq, Souadi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and the removal of the independent option of the plebiscite questions in British Southern Cameroons because of the petrol deposits initially discovered by the French in Ndian Division described as: *une petite cadeaux de la*

¹⁶«Boko Haram : Le bras Armé de L'Occident pour détruire le Nigéria et chasser la Chine du golfe de Guinée », 16 novembre 2014, retrieved in 2015, available at <http://www.toutsaufsarkozy.com>.

¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france>, accessed Friday 5th May 2017.

¹⁸ Adam Lusher, "Libya: Sarkozy and Gadaffi before they fell out" London, *BBC World News*, 19 Mar 2011, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8393320/Libya-Sarkozy-and-Gadaffi-before-they-fell-out.html>, accessed 5th May 2017.

*reine*¹⁹. Based on all these conflicts engineered by the West, there is therefore no doubt that the above allegations could be founded as David posits:

Boko Haram a trouvé des appuis à l'extérieur. N'attendons pas que des compatriotes mal à l'aise et qui crient leur mal être, en viennent un jour, par désespoir, à rechercher des appuis à l'extérieur. Nous discutons bien avec des criminels, pour libérer des otages ! Discutons avec tous les compatriotes qui en ressentent le besoin, pour libérer le Cameroun des menaces à la paix, à sa stabilité et à sa sécurité.²⁰

Nonetheless, the above charges against the West do not provide ample evidence because we do not have the material prove to support the claims that Boko Haram had Western members notably (USA, Britain and France). At this stage, the charges against the West are by far allegations built on conspiracy theories that are not backed by tangible evidence. Yet, one thing is clear that the weaponry used by Boko is a product of the West. Therefore, if the West is not responsible, who then supplied the arms? For the West to escape this allegation, they should disclaim and provide a satisfactory evidence that the arms and ammunitions in the hands of Boko Haram are not of their own making.

Reasons for Extension

The founder (Marwa Arka Maitatsine) of Boko Haram in Kano was not a Nigerian but a Cameroonian and subsequently exported it to Cameroon in 1962.²¹ The sect's importation to Cameroon could be justified by the cultural, religious, economic, geographical and political realities. The first clarification is that terrorists operations such as highway robbery, abductions, kidnappings, hostage takings, ransoms and assassinations were not new in the northern part of Cameroon. For instance, the activities of *coupeurs de route* in this part of the country were not strange as Siabou Issa holds it that:

Le banditisme de grand chemin, avantage connu aujourd'hui sous l'appellation de phénomène des coupeurs de route, est une pratique à la fois séculaire et universelle. Qu'il s'agisse de L'Europe médiévale ou de l'Amérique du temps de la pionnier, de l'Asie centrale ou de l'Afrique précoloniale, razzias, pillages... perturbe les voies de

¹⁹ Frederick Alobwede Ebong, "International law acknowledges Southern Cameroons as a State with Recognized Boundaries Fixed by the League of Nations.", Available at <http://www.camer.be/56747/30:27/cameroun-cameroon-the-anglophone-problem-hon-wirba39s-secret-weapon-.html>, accessed on the 22nd March 2017,p.2.

²⁰ David Abouem a Tchoyi, "Comprendre le Probleme Anglophone...Pour Mieux le Resoudre" p.12, available at abouematchoyi@yahoo.fr/davidabouem@gmail.com, accessed 15th April 2017.

²¹ Valentine Odika, "Maitatsine Bloodbath;nigeria's religious Terror of the 80's", Saturday 28th December 2013,p.6. at valentineodika.blogspot.com

communication, le quotidien des opérateurs économiques et la vie des entités politiques.²²

Although from the quotation, Saibou was not particular to north Cameroon, it is in recorded history that this part of the country had been taken hostage by the *coupeurs* for long. This seemingly suggests that the terrain for terrorism in northern Cameroon was already well experiment and prepared. The opportunity then resurfaced when Boko Haram was under pressure in Nigerian and simply extended to the awaiting territory in the north of Cameroon.

Some activities of the *coupeurs* such as kidnapping, assassination, looting, robbery and ransom takings were in no way different from that of Boko Haram. This suggest that although the *coupeurs* might have been dismantled, some of them went underground already indoctrinated with violence. It was probably the remaining *coupeurs* who were violent, courageous and mastered the terrain that provided fighters, space, shelter and ideas to the sect that made it possible to survive in Cameroon.

Based on these, it is likely that surviving member of the *coupeurs* could be very reliable to Boko Haram. At this stage, three variables are seemingly probable for the existence of Boko Haram in Cameroon. In the first place, Cameroon Boko Haram was a mere extension of the Nigerian sect, secondly, it was simply a new phase, resurrection of *coupeurs de route* with new appellation and thirdly, it was a guise by the political elite of the northern regions of Cameroon to regain power.

Another undeniable factor that could justify the importation of Boko Haram to Cameroon was the wide and uncontrolled porous borderline between Cameroon and Nigeria.²³ The uncontrolled frontiers created the possibility for terrorists to circulate across the Lake Chad basin and easily acquire arms and ammunitions without the knowledge of the military. This supposition is substantiated by the fact that the foreign minister of Niger told reporters that Nigerians have been trained in rebel camps across the Sahel region. He further noted that the group's five leadership (Abubakar Shekau) relocated to a hideout in northern Cameroon.²⁴

²² Saibou Issa, *Les Coupeurss de Route: Histoire du Banditisme Rural et Transfrontalier dans le bassin du lac Tchad*, Paris, KARTHALA, 2010, p.7.

²³ Freedom, "Boko Haram..." 2012, p.5.

²⁴ Andrew, "What is Boko...", 2012, pp.4-5.

It could equally be added that the escape of sect members to Cameroon was due to the death of Yusuf. After his death, the other members were under a serious manhunt by the Nigerian government and since the two countries are much closed, Cameroon provided the space needed by the sect. There could be no other reason while Abubakar Shekau could easily access northern Cameroon without being identified and arrested different from the closeness and porous borders between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is clear that during their stay in northern Cameroon they gained sympathisers who then borrowed Boko Haram's ideology.

The socio-cultural composition of northern Cameroon could justify the easy extension of the sect to Cameroon. The dressing, feeding and languages such as Fulfude, Haoussa and Arabic were very common amongst the people. Africans easily identify their relatives through their culture and so was the case with the extension of the sect to Cameroon. From the religious standpoint, the population of the region was largely Islamic purportedly associated to violence and terrorism. Besides, Abubakar Shekau and other followers easily refuge in northern Cameroon because of the cultural affinities.

The Fulfude, Haoussa and Arabic languages were widely used and understood in the region thus making it easy for speakers of such languages to infiltrate the population unchecked by the authorities. The only reason why Maitatsine was able to form the sect without difficulties in Kano was because of the language factor and this too favoured the importation of the sect to north Cameroon.

The population were not literate and since the Islamic schools were not mostly ran by qualified scholars and the Quran that was not permitted to be read and interpreted by everyone, scholars taught their faithful's what they considered to be the will of God. Since Islam is dogmatic and impedes reasoning, the active youth were brain-watched by some of the scholars and Boko blossomed. Boko certainly had little or no task to exchange their philosophy with the Cameroonian faithful's in the mosque or in their hiding leading to the extension of the sect. It has to be noted that a well cultivated mind is difficult to admit any information without questioning but unfortunately the low level of youth education in the area rendered the large and active population vulnerable to the Boko doctrine.

Another social problem was that of generalised poverty as a consequence of the absence developmental projects and corporations. It is vital to restate here that one of the reasons why the witty Maitatsine succeeded to create the sect in Kano was due to high

poverty in the area. So, the northern part of Cameroon provided a very level ground required by Boko that easily gained the hearts of the impoverished. The practice of street begging as a characteristic of abject poverty by children was very common in the northern part of Cameroon. Such children became vulnerable to Boko upon presentation of few bank notes.²⁵ The northern part of Cameroon had a very huge, active and youthful population required by Boko Haram. Like Marwa, his successors were quick enough to notice this resource and the large and active population was idling. Boko knew that such population was at the beg and call of the rich. They then fully imported the sect to Cameroon knowing very well that the unemployed population could not resist money at the exchange of their lives.

Far from the above was largely the part played by the political elite of the region in electoral manipulation and fraud; a common practice in Cameroon. During elections, the political elite quite often from the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) employed all fraudulent mechanisms to win in their constituencies to betray the President into believing that they had a large following from the base. In the north just like in many other places in Cameroon, the CPDM political elite employed expatriates from neighbouring Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Central Africa during elections.

In complicity with the administering authorities, they issued Cameroon national identification papers to non-nationals. After elections, the immigrants remained in Cameroon suggesting that they were the major importers of the sect into the country.²⁶ Such a practice by the political elite was so disastrous to nation building and must be condemned in strong terms. Therefore, the political elite whether by chance or design were largely responsible for the extension of Boko to Cameroon.

It would appear that the alleged northern elite were inspired by those of northern Nigeria on the claims that:

Si Boko Haram recrute avec tant de facilité au Nigeria, c'est aussi parce que les dirigeants successifs de ce pays se sont illustrés par une redistribution inéquitable des ressources pétrolières. Exemple : l'écart entre le taux de scolarisation au Sud et au Nord du pays est abyssal. Pareil pour la couverture sanitaire. Tenez ! Sur 100 000 femmes qui enfantent au Nigeria, 1 800 meurent au Nord contre 80 dans le Sud du

²⁵ Valentine, "Maitatsine Bloodbath...", 2013,p.6.

²⁶Anonymous, group discussion with four colleagues from Maroua, University of Yaounde 1 campus, 23rd October 2014.

même pays. Face à cette misère entretenue par les hommes politiques généralement empêtrés dans les affaires de corruption et de détournement de deniers publics, les populations des zones lésées sont réceptives aux manipulations.²⁷

Although the above extrapolation remains an allegation for the lack of evidence, there is every reason based on the activities of the Northern political elite to be taken to task to clear their throat of dealings with the sect. On this note, before we delve into the consequences of the sect it will be very necessary to unveil the affected.

Displaced Persons

A displaced person is a general term covering all persons who have moved from their original habitations to another against their will. However due to some international and regional conventions like the UNHCR in 1961, New York protocol of 1967, the OAU convention in 1969, the Cartagena Declarations in 1984, the definition of a displaced person was modified.

In international law, displaced persons include: refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, exceptional leave to remain, asylum seekers, illegal migrants, temporal leave to remain, economic migrants, fugitives and stateless persons.²⁸ In spite all these, our study is focussed on refugees and IDPs that were affected by Boko Haram in Cameroon.

According to Osita C. Eze, a refugee is defined as a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.²⁹ The definition is full of shortcomings, as it does not consider all refugees emanating from similar violence. In relation to these lacunae, the OAU in 1969 added that a refugee shall also apply to persons who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order

²⁷ <http://www.camer.be/40774/11:1/cameroun-boko-haram-retour-de-a>, <http://www.etudiant-ados.com/pages/actualite-afrique/camer/le-boko-haram-enleve-l-epouse-d-amadou-ali-ce->, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/accessed> Friday 30th September 2016.

²⁸ David, Nchinda Keming, "Differentiating Refugees from other Displaced Persons: Cameroon Experience", *Revue scientifique pluridisciplinaire du département d'Histoire de la Faculté des Arts et Sciences humaines de l'Université de Yaoundé I, HABARU*, Vol. I N° 2, juin 2014, pp.353-363. See also, http://www.unhcr.org.uk/info/briefings/basic_facts/definitions.html, downloaded on the 14th May 2007.

²⁹ Osita C., Eze, *Human Rights in Africa*, Lagos, Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd, 1984, pp.170-172.

to seek refuge in another place or outside the country of his nationality.³⁰ Judging from the above definitions, there is no doubt that thousands of Nigerians who searched sanctuary in Cameroon were truly refugees and victims of Boko Haram worth studying.

David Mayer classifies refugees into rural and urban.³¹ Rural refugees are again sub structured into those in camp and in settlements. The word rural refers to the countryside³² and UNHCR calls on all states to promote durable solutions in order to assist refugees in a spirit of international solidarity and burden sharing.³³ Urban refugees are largely individuals who actually device plans to escape their home country to another for fear of persecution in order to enjoy certain freedoms. Their exile is usually politicised, well thought of, well organised and highly ambitious than rural refugees. This is justified by the fact that they do not often settle at the frontiers alongside the rural population as the rural refugees but prefer mostly the major towns of the host countries. Also, urban refugees come from both neighbouring countries and continents. For example, by December 2008, Cameroon hosted 5 Yugoslavian refugees, 1 Iraqi, 1 Iranian, 62.919 Chadians and 86 Liberians.

However, it will be far-fetched to conclude here that urban refugees always plan for their exile, are organised professionals, job seekers and students. This is so because in Douala and Yaounde, there was a composition of old and unproductive refugees who only depended on the HCR for survival, unskilled young men/women and unaccompanied children. This kind of composition is an indication that they come from neighbouring countries but are not always willing to settle with the rural population.

On the other hand, IDPs³⁴ are people who have been forced to flee their homes caused by natural or human occurrences but do not cross internationally recognised border.³⁵ The IDPs in our case are Cameroonians who were forcefully displaced by Boko. In

³⁰UNHCR, "OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa", Geneva, UNHCR, 2006, p.3.

³¹ David Mayer, *Afrique Terre des Réfugiés...*, 1984, pp.113-119

³² Paperback (ed.), *Collins English Dictionary & Thesaurus*, Third edition, Westerhill Road, HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2006, p.666. See also, Jonathan Crowther (ed.), *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Fifth edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.1032. *Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.1097.

³³ *Yearbook of the United Nations*, Vol. 38th, New York, Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, pp. 937.

³⁴ Internally displaced persons. These are people who have been uprooted by natural or man-made hazards but have not cross international borders. They suffer from the same humanitarian problems like refugees. They fall outside the definition of a refugee according to the 1951 Geneva Convention because they are still under the protection of their home governments. However, they sometimes profit from the HCR's humanitarian aid because of their plight.

³⁵ Melquades J. Gamba, *A Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy*, New York, Oceania Publications Inc., 1973, p.25.

1994, the High Commissioner urged governments to provide speedy humanitarian assistance to countries affected by IDPs.³⁶ IDPs are often wrongly called refugees. Unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed an international border but remained inside their home countries. Common examples are victims of tsunami that hit Japanese cities in 2011, the floods in India and the floods in Anambra state (Nigeria). Besides, other cases were the floods in Maroua and Bamenda (Babessi/Widikum) regions of Cameroon in 2012.³⁷

Even if they have fled for similar reasons as refugees, IDPs legally remain under the protection of their own governments. As citizens, they retain all their rights and protection under both human rights and international humanitarian law. At the end of 2008, there were an estimated 26 million IDPs around the world with the largest in Sudan, Colombia and Iraq.³⁸

Effects of Boko Haram on the Displaced

There are basically two types of displaced persons that were affected by the ferocity of the sect notably: refugees and IDPs and have subsequently been assessed below.

Rights and Freedoms

The inalienable rights of mankind include amongst others the right to life, movement, liberty, ownership of property and security. The sect killed thousands of innocent individuals, looted and seized the property of others, deprived some of their homes and caused the mass movements of others to resettle in places against their will. Although the state share some responsibilities in their insufficient efforts to protect and safeguard individual rights and freedoms, which should be their primary responsibility, the absence of civil normalcy, the imposition of curfews and emergency rule which restricted movement and communication in northern part of the country were a direct consequence of the sect.

The forced conversion of people of other faiths to Islam, wanton attacks on churches and mosques, murder, torture and persecution of members of other religions, the killing of women, children and noncombatant populations reveal deep violations of human

³⁶ *Yearbook of the United Nations*, Vol. 48th, The Hague, Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 1217

³⁷ Choves Loh, "Babessi Floods: Public Services on Resettlement Site", Yaounde, C. T., N^o 10194, Monday 8th September 2012, pp. 16-17., Choves Loh, "Floods Destroyed Property in Widikum", Yaounde, C. T., N^o 10195, Tuesday 9th September 2012, pp. 16-17 and Jean Francis Belibi, "Inondation dans le grand Nord", Yaounde, C. T., N^o 10178, Vendredi 14 Septembre 2012, pp. 1-2.

³⁸ http://www.unhcr.org.uk/info/briefings/basic_facts/definitions.html, retrieved on the 14th May 2007, p.5.

rights.³⁹ Based on the UNHCR report, not fewer than 5,000 people were displaced in the North East region of Nigeria as a result of the raging insurgency. Some 10,000 Nigerians crossed into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Also, about 8100 Nigerians sought refuge in Cameroon. The number of Nigerian refugees in Niger was 2,700 and in Chad 150.⁴⁰

In April 2013, what was considered the most outrageous women and girl child abuse perpetuated by the sect was the abduction of more than 200 Chibok school girls.⁴¹ The implication of the Chibok case for the rights of women and the girl child is that their identity and roles, their rights and protection, their sexuality and bodies remained under the control of the sect. This also reveals the extent to which the sect disempowered the women. When the remaining 182 of the 200 Chibok school girls were finally freed in May 2017 one of them already married to a Boko Haram refused to return home.⁴² This act was a reconstruction of the purity and honour of the identity of the woman and girl child along lines of an Islamist community, certainly different from what they would have loved to belong if they were autonomous. This created fear and mass protest among women and Cameroon displaced were not an exception.

Although there were no such abductions on a massive scale, the lives, liberty and property of those living in the Far North Region where the sect gained roots were not secured. Initially, the sect used to launch isolated attacks until 19th February 2013 when a family of seven French citizens was kidnapped in Waza national park. In November of the same year, a French priest, Rev. Georges Vandenbeusch was kidnapped. In April 2014 Italian and Canadian clergymen also fell into the dragnet of the sect and within that same period the traditional ruler of Goumouldi was found dead in Nigeria, apparently brutally beheaded by the sect. In the night of 16 to 17 May 2014, ten Chinese nationals were abducted from Waza. This made life unbearable in the region most especially to refugees who wrongly thought had found a haven.

Although the victims above were later released after negotiations between the government and the sect members, it multiplied attacks on a massive scale; killing

³⁹ Chukwuma *et al*, "Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency", *Global Journal of Human-Social Science*, Vol. XIV, Issue I, Version 1.0, 2014, pp.38-50, p.45. available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/accessed> Friday 30th September 2016.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.38-50.

⁴¹ As a result of the abduction, an international movement dubbed "Bring back our girls" has been mobilising the national and international governments to engage in more affirmative action to have the girls back safely.

⁴² CNN News, May 2017

individuals, raiding villages and looting property. In the Far North of Cameroon in order to control the activities of the sect, the freedom of movement and free circulation of people and bikes was again limited to 8pm.⁴³

Psychological Effects

The psychological trauma that came with the terrorism of the sect was unmeasurable. The people around the areas where the sect acted lived in uninterrupted panic. In spite of the massive deployment of soldiers to secure life and property, the fear of the unknown loomed very much in the air. Given the sect members could not be easily identified just from a physical look for lack of uniforms, the fear of the enemy remained pressing. No one knew when it could be his turn to be attacked but everyone knew that it was likely probable. The fear of the sect remained a psychological trauma that can be likened to a general state of claustrophobia.⁴⁴

Equally, a good number of Cameroonians deserted their homes, became wanderers, lost children, others abducted including Chinese workers at Waza and all these created panic in the region. Some Boko Haram fighters were forcefully recruiting children and some who happened to escape the sect became homeless as they could not trace their way back. Added to this, President Biya noted that the attack in Nkolofata led to the death of many, abduction of Chinese workers, and the killing of the displaced causing untold panic.⁴⁵ In response to their plight, Cameroon Red Cross (CRC) struggled to reach their parents in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.⁴⁶ On the 2nd March 2015 Boko Haram published a video online in which they executed two men charged of espionage. This was intended to create trauma in the displaced.⁴⁷

According to J.F. Belibi, the activities of Boko Haram could be described as: “Triest! Choquante! Traumatisante! cruelle! desagréable. [...], pas d’adjectif plus fort pour qualifier l’image de 39 cercuils, recouverts du drapeau vert-rouge jaune, exposer vendredi dernier a

⁴³ Peter N. Efande, “Many suffer untold Danger”, Cameroon Tribune (CT) Number (N⁰) 10808/7007, 26th March 2015, p.8.

⁴⁴ Wilfred Nyongbet Gabsa and Norbert fru Suh I, “The Boko Haram Conondrome: A Menace Against the Contours of Liberal Societies (Case of Cameroon and Nigeria)”, forthcoming, pp.7-11.

⁴⁵ Gregoire Djarmaila, “ La vie au camp de Minawao”, CT No 10755/6954, vendredi 09 Janvier 2015, p.17.

⁴⁶ Peter, “Many suffer untold...” 2015, p.8.

⁴⁷ Paul Biya, “ Every State has the right but also the duty to protect its citizens”, CT No 10750/6949, Friday 2nd January 2015, p.4

la cour d'honneur de la Brigarde du Quartier General a Yaounde. ”⁴⁸ They were accordingly killed on the 13,16,17,27 and 28 December 2014 in Djibrili Limani,Vreket, Ashigashia, Kenguilari, Double and Amchide. Others were also killed on the 4,6,16 and 25 February 2015 in Fotokol, Mora, Waza and Limani. All these created fear not only to the displaced but to the entire nation because some young men who succeeded in the military recruitment seeing the 39 coffins feared, called off their candidacy and vowed never to attempt joining the armed force.

Social implications

The displaced in the Far North of Cameroon suffered a lot as the region was characterised by the closure of Churches, deserted homes, snack bars, schools and hospitals. There were also overcrowded refugee camps. For example, the Minawao camp hosted 10,269 refugee children in one primary school, camp teachers from among the Nigerian refugees without pay, insufficient food, problems between refugees and IDPs over the fetching of fire wood, malaria fever, unwanted pregnancies and diverse infections.⁴⁹

Gregoir Djarmaila maintained that Minawao camp is about 15km from Fotokol, Mayo-Tsanaga division, refugees are in deplorable conditions. They are mixed with the locals of Mayo-Tsanaga, Diamare, Logone and Chari and Mayo-Sava all benefited from the generosity of local Cameroonians. He also noted the problems of illnesses and hunger as some of the consequences resulting from the fact that the displaced Cameroonians could not work on their farms for fear of sect's attacks. As this was not enough, the situation was aggravated by drought and floods from the River Logone and Chari causing the lost of property and lives.⁵⁰ In addition, 136 schools were closed in Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava.⁵¹

Economic impact

The incursion of Boko Haram on Cameroon brought the economy of the Far North Region to a standstill. For example, the closure of the bordering line of the region with Nigeria, customs post of Fotokol, dead economic activities, like the closure of bars, stores, snacks,

⁴⁸ Simon Peter Etoundi, “Terrorisme: vigilance accrue”, CT N0 10793/6992, May 2015, p.32.

⁴⁹ Peter, “Many suffer untold...” 2015, p.8., Peter, “An overcrowded Minawao refugee Camp”, CT N⁰ 10808/7007, 26th March 2015, p.10.

⁵⁰ Gregoire Djarmaila, “La vie au camp de Minawao”, CT No 10755/6954, vendredi 09 Janvier 2015, p.17., Nkendem Forbinake, " Far North : Priority of Priorities", CT N0 10758/6957, Wednesday 14th January 2015, p.5.

⁵¹ Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), 6:30 PM News, 31st March 2015.

tourism in Waza, no farming, no sale of goats, sheep, cattle across the borders, drop in the price of a kilogram of meat in Mokolo from 2000 to 1500 was of great loss to the displaced. It should also be noted that the invading Nigerian refugees forced the local IDPs to abandon their farms in which they cultivated guinea corn, sorghum and maize for sale to refuge in the area where farming was not possible.⁵² The closure and abandonment of their economic activities meant that Cameroon IDPs became unproductive just like refugees and had no other means of making money which was a serious blow to the displaced.

In a similar case, Kwenmbwen Abdias a herdsman of Ding-Ding maintained that all commercial activities are dead because of the displacement of the population and worst still the closure of the borders with Nigeria meant that he could no longer make a living from rearing cattle in which he usually supplied in Nigeria. Accordingly, trade was no longer possible in the border villages of Mayor-Tsanaga. Initially, Nigerians brought goods like fuel (zoa-zoa) and Cameroonians came with sheep, cattle, cereals (corn, sorghum and groundnuts)⁵³ which were their major sources of income. The sect's terrorism actually brought the economy grounded since such items could no longer be commercialised between Nigerians and Cameroonians.

Impact on religion

The principal aim of Boko Haram was to create a purely Islamic state governed by *Shariah* laws. If one pictures the sect from this prism, it will imply that it was an Islamic faith. Unfortunately, they kill innocent people like Christians, Muslims, Animist, Traditionalists and many more irrespective of their faith. They also burn churches and mosque like the case of Mabass Village where the Baptist Church was burnt and on the 4th February 2015 the sect attacked Fotokol village killing hundreds including the Imam and 33 Muslims in a morning prayer.⁵⁴ Their claim to Islam is very questionable if one looks critically at their activities and the fact that true Muslims denied any links, knowledge and violence perpetuated by the sect.

⁵² Peter, "Many suffer untold...", 2015, pp.8-10., Nkendem Forbinake, "Far North : Priority of Priorities", CT N⁰ 10758/6957, Wednesday 14th January 2015, p.5., Peter, "Upbeat Mood at the War front", CT, N⁰ 10786/6985, Tuesday 24th February 2015, p.15.

⁵³ Joel Maman, "Mayo-Tsanaga: Des comités de vigilance en intense activite" CT, N⁰ 10786/6985, Tuesday 24th February 2015, p.6.

⁵⁴ Emmanuel Kendemeh, "Boko Haram Incursion: Chad Steps up Preventive Measures", CT N⁰ 10756/6955, Monday 12th January, 2015, p.32., Peter N. Efande, "Upbeat Mood at the War front", CT, N⁰ 10786/6985, Tuesday 24th February 2015, p.15.

For example, Muslims clerics and dignitaries meeting in Yaounde and Douala in dissimilar occasions organised solemn prayer sessions and denounced Boko Haram stating that it was none Muslim. According to them, Islam is a religion of peace and does not fan violence as propagated by the sect. They resolved to go into the interior of the country and sensitise their faithful's to denounce and stay away from the ferocious sect. Such a stance was also taken in a meeting of experts in Yaounde by: United States of America, United Nations, Africa Union, European Union, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, European Community, African States, Economic Community of West African States, Lake Chad Basin Commission, France and Britain.⁵⁵

In a similar line, Prof. Jean Paul Messina noted that in deserted villages of the Far North, the displaced have lost family members, wealth, hope, separated to unknown destinations, do not know peace and all of these have made them not to know what and how to belief in God again.⁵⁶ In like manner, Prof. Antoine Essomba Fouda captures the effect on religion from another angle and supposed a therapy. According to him, Boko Haram's extremism must be dealt with. He further called for collective prayer throughout the national territory, discouraged those who affiliate with the sect and on to generate the national solidarity funds to assist both the military and the displaced.⁵⁷

Human casualties and property

The fight in Nkolofata led to the dead of 143 sect fighters, a soldier and many displaced. Also, when Chad joined the war in air strives destroying untold property, 2000 people were killed. In Waza in the Logone and Chari division, Cameroon soldiers killed 102 sect members lost five soldiers, destroyed many vehicles, captured devices owned by the sect and amour car. Also in December 20th 2014, Mabass Baptist Church was burnt, many displaced killed and many boys and girls were abducted.⁵⁸ Note that most of the sect's members killed were the displaced forcefully recruited.

Equally, on the 4th of February 2015, Boko Haram stormed Fotokol in the Logone and Chari division killing hundreds of displaced including the Imam and 33 Muslims in a morning

⁵⁵ George Mballa, "Fight Against Boko Haram Terrorism: Muslims Clerics Discredit Boko Haram Doctrine", CT, N0 10762/6961, Tuesday 20th January 2015, p.3., Messi Mballa, "Lutte Contre Boko Haram: On planclie sur la concepte d'operation", CT, N0 10774/6973, Thursday 5th February 2015, p.2.

⁵⁶ Brenda Y.Nchewnang- Ngassa, "fight Against boko Haram: Catholic Church Preaches Peace and Solidarity", CT, No 10793/6992, Thursday 5th March 2015, p.16.

⁵⁷ Brenda, "fight Against Boko...", 2015, p.16.

⁵⁸ Isa Chiroma Bakary, "143 Assailants Killed Yesterday", CT, N0 10757/6956, Tuesday 13th January 2015, p.2., ⁵⁸ Emmanuel Kendemeh, "Boko Haram Incursion...", 2015, p.32.,

prayer. The surviving displaced had no place to hide as their houses were either destroyed completely or guttered with bullets.⁵⁹ In Amchide and Limani, the sect attacked Cameroon soldiers on the 15th of October 2014, 8th November 2014 in Kerawa and 8th October 2014 killing eleven soldiers, many locals and others displaced.⁶⁰ Note has to be taken here that the most affected divisions were Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo Sava and Logone and chari. For the worst affected frontier villages, they include: Wandai, Ndaman, Mabass, Tourou, and Ding-Ding. In an oral interview by Peter N. Efande with some of the villagers, (Mohammed Bluma) a guinea corn farmer he said: "Everything is either burnt or destroyed, Fotokol is a ghost town".⁶¹

According to this IDP, Fotokol was deserted; nothing was functioning in the town. For example, all schools were short-down, no commerce and besides, he lost four members of his family and that several years are required to reconstruct the town. Though he ended confidently that with the presence of Cameroon soldiers, his moral is re-boasted and assurance of ending his present status as an IDP was guaranteed. In a similar spirit, Luka Barka a member of a vigilante committee of Mabass maintained that he was not intimidated by Boko Haram and that they were ready to collaborate with the army.⁶² At this end, the consequences of Boko terrorism on the displaced could simply be described as devastatingly chronic. Faced with the tonnage repercussions of the sect on the displaced, many attempts were taken by the military, government and many other humanitarian organisations to restore hope in the affected displaced worthy to be mentioned.

Attempted solutions

In response to the consequences discussed above, the Ministry of Basic education stepped in and constructed 280 classrooms, 136 water pumps as well as toilets for the displaced in the region.⁶³ The ministry came in to assist IDPs and refugees because they were suffering from untold diseases like malaria fever, diarrhoea and insect bites. It has to be noted that the displaced were not only assisted by the government but also by the CRC, UNHCR and

⁵⁹ Peter, "Upbeat Mood at...", 2015, p.15.

⁶⁰ Kimeng Hilton Ndukum, "War Against Boko Haram", CT, N0, 10728/6927, Monday 1st December 2014, p.13.

⁶¹ Peter, "Evacuating the Sick and the Wounded", CT, N0, 10786/6985, Tuesday 24th February 2015, p.18.

⁶² Peter, "Evacuating the Sick..." 2015, p.18.

⁶³ Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), 6:30 PM News, 31st March 2015.

the military doctors as Mayor Nlate Ebale of the Operation ALPHA puts it that: “[...] we also offer health services to the sick and wounded civilians.”⁶⁴

When the UNHCR bus (Antonio Guterres visited the Minawao refugee camp, he appreciated Cameroon government for providing sanctuary to Nigerian refugees and the IDPS. In spite the intervention of the government, rights/humanitarian organisations, friendly countries in bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, the assistance was just temporal and insufficient given the continuous attacks and far-reaching effects of the sect on the displaced in Cameroon.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The consequences of Boko terrorism on the displaced in Cameroon were far reaching and in spite the intervention of government and other organisations to help restore hope in the displaced, it still remained a very serious challenge. Besides humanitarian intervention, military approach was highly required to scare the sect. The results of our analyses reveals that the response was effectively positive justified by the drastic drop in the sect's operations in Cameroon and the whole LCBCs. Although the sect's operations decreased, it is important to underscore that terrorism is an international malaise and that Cameroon hosts a fertile ground for terrorists' activism. This remark thus implies that: Boko Haram was just weakened and not completely defeated, it retreated to gather momentum and to resurface someday and that its financier's network was disassembled and it subsequently dwindled.

Judging from these hypotheses, it is but obvious that the sect could probably reappear someday even under a different appellation. The lessons drawn above are very essential to governments, stakeholders, politicians to continue to monitor the possible rebirth of terrorism and most especially academics to branch out from the mainstream. Of course, terrorism is international and can take different forms and names but the essential could just be their objectives.

At this juncture, the most important questions is: What can Cameroon and the LCBCs do to permanently eradicate terrorism in general and Boko Haram in particular? Our research holds that in order to absolutely eradicate terrorism in general and particularly Boko Haram, the LCBCs and Africa must speak with one voice. This implies that what affects

⁶⁴Peter, “Evacuating the Sick...”, 2015, p.17.

a single country should become the business of all. This leads us to President Nkwami Nkruma's idea of a must United Africa. We honestly admit here that this is not the first academic work to address the issue as so many scholars have documented on the subject. In spite this; there is possibly no single scholar that can articulate the Boko Haram eradication in Cameroon thus requiring recommendations based on our own modest contribution.

In respect of the analyses made this far, our recommendations are articulated around the following major areas: the enclave nature of the region, poverty, desertion, idleness absence of developmental projects, poor education, the heretic Islamic preaching, limited presence of paramilitary forces, porous borders, activities of the political elite, proclamations of some government officials, and the existence of pockets of sponsors of Boko Haram. It is generally believed that where a road passes, development follows and this saying is supported by the fact that good roads are accompanied by investors. From our sources, Boko Haram operated in the most enclave parts of Cameroon's Far North region implying that it dreaded the highways. So if good roads and more developmental projects are implemented in the affected areas, they will pull national and foreign investors that will employ the jobless youth, reduce poverty, raise their living standards, stop desertion of the youth, end idleness, educate and distract them from lending their services to Boko Haram thus bringing the sect to an end.

In addition, poor education or illiteracy in the Far North region of Cameroon was one of the fundamental reasons for the vulnerability of the youth to Boko Haram. An empty mind cannot make the difference between right and wrong and thus provides a fertile ground for the sect to implant and survive. Investing in education remains the sole option that can give meaning to the youth and the reason why they should give value to their lives and resist all temptation from Boko Haram. The government of Cameroon therefore has the heavy task of massively investing in the education of the youth to dissuade them from joining the sect.

More so, the heretic Islamic teaching in the area must be seriously monitored by the government. The curricular of Islamic preaching must be checked and validated in consultation with Muslim clerics to ensure that violent Islam is absolutely erased, unqualified, unauthorised preachers and schools shut down or banned from proselytising in the region. The opening of professional Islamic training schools strictly doctored by the

government will produce qualified and moderate Islamic teachers that can save the followers of Allah from the heresy and violence introduced by Boko Haram in Cameroon.

In addition, the government must permanently step up security as it is the only determinant for any meaningful human activity to succeed. The defeat of Boko Haram in Cameroon came as a result of heavy military presence and coverage of the porous borders with the neighbouring countries and must be maintained as such. The massive presence of the military is a panacea to the circulation of the agents of the sect, smugglers of arms, suppliers, financiers and other resources. If these security measures are applied, Boko Haram will be completely crucified and wiped out of existence.

Far afield, for a complete eradication of Boko Haram, the government must bring the traditional authorities of the areas concerned on board. This is so because: the population of the region is more attached to the local authorities than the government, they have power and control over the locals, they also have their eyes on the ground, can easily identify strangers, sponsors and sect members than the government. Besides the local authorities, the political elite of the region and government officials have a heavy responsibility in ending Boko Haram. The phenomenon of importing foreigners from Nigeria, Chad and Central Africa by the political elite in complicity with administrators, frontier police and customs personnel during elections to fill the ballot boxes for the CPDM party is characteristic of the region. The end to such an evil and criminal practice whereby foreigners are cheaply offered Cameroon nationality during elections could be a good therapy for a permanent end to the sect.

In the same line, the elite of the Far North had been at the forefront of negotiating with Boko Haram on behalf of the government for the liberation of hostages. Worst still is the fact that the tagged bank notes used to pay ransoms to the sect were tracked in individual bank accounts in financial institutions in the region and even in the hands of some individuals and even Biya's collaborators in Cameroon's Unity Palace. Their involvement in the negotiation suggests that they know the sect members, where they are lodged and the reasons for their terrorism. Added to this were open declarations made by some government officials that Boko Haram is amongst them. Such public declarations are pregnant with meaning suggesting that they had a clue of Boko Haram terrorism in Cameroon. To this end, the government simply needs to bring the front line negotiators and the identified officials on board to get a lasting solution to Boko Haram. Above all

recommendations, Cameroon government must remain in permanent diplomacy with all the identified or possible Western countries whose weapons were identified in the hands of Boko Haram. The sect could not survive without weaponry and as such, if Cameroon is able to achieve this diplomatic victory, Boko Haram would only exist in the annals of History.

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