Success of Indian National Health Protection Scheme needs creative destruction of mines of healthcare corruption
Keywords:
Healthcare corruption, Universal healthcare, Healthcare insurance, Indian Healthcare
Abstract
We need Universal healthcare in India, Government has launched world’s biggest health
insurance programme covering half billion population with risk cover of INR 500,000 ($
7500). Free healthcare will take away one major worry of poor masses. Things are going to
change over the years with better healthcare, less sickness, less work loss, no medical
expenditure related bankruptcy, better economic prospects & more food availability. This
scheme will lead to enhanced business activities at all level, will create the job at many
levels, there will the expansion of healthcare industry, but later it will lead to increased
pollution and climate change leading to the new spectrum of diseases, increased health care
use and increased insurance expenditure. Major problem is that corruption involves various
layers of the healthcare system, including care providers, pharmacies, laboratories,
corporate hospitals, mom and pop hospitals, clinics, pharmaceutical and instrument
companies. Policymakers should use all technologies based measures including artificial
intelligence, blockchain technology, universal biometrics in healthcare, global positioning
system, digital monitoring, mobile applications, point of care technologies, system reforms,
big data collection, nudging, mobile health, telehealth, mass education, culture change and
strong laws to prevent corruption as well as illness. Avoidance of inspector policy is best. For
the success of the programme mines of healthcare, corruption must be destroyed.
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PMID: 19000405
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39. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness
Book by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler
path to universal coverage; 2010
2. Norheim O, Ottersen T, Berhane F, Chitah B, Cookson R, Daniels N, et al. Making fair
choices on the path to universal health coverage: Final report of the WHO
consultative group on equity and universal health coverage: World Health
Organization; 2014.
3. The government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. NCMH: Report of
the National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 2005.
4. The government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
NSSO 71st Round (January—June 2014): Key Indicators of Social Consumption in
India Health. 2015.
5. Van Doorslaer E, O’Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, Somanathan A, Adhikari SR, Garg CC,
et al. Effect of payments for health care on poverty estimates in 11 countries in Asia:
an analysis of household survey data. The Lancet. 2006; 368(9544): 1357–1364.
6. Garg CC, Karan AK. Reducing out-of-pocket expenditures to reduce poverty: a
disaggregated analysis at rural-urban and state level in India. Health Policy and
planning. 2009; 24(2): 116–128. doi: 10.1093/ heapol/czn046 PMID: 19095685
7. Berman P, Ahuja R, Bhandari L. The impoverishing effect of healthcare payments in
India: New methodology and findings. Economic & Political Weekly. 2010; 45(16):
65–71. Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. National Rural
Health Mission (2005– 2012) Mission Document.
8. Bang A, Chatterjee M, Das gupta J, Garg A, Jain Y, Shiv Kumar AK, et al. High level
expert group report on universal health coverage for India. New Delhi, Planning
Commission of India. 2011.
9. “Healthcare: Reaching out to the masses” KPMG whitepaper
10. "Major Disease in India." India Health Progress
(http://www.indiahealthprogress.in)
11. "Financing and Delivery of Health Care Services in India”, Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare Government of India.
12. Aarogyasri Health Insurance Scheme. [Internet]. [cited 2016 17 Feb]. Available from:
http://www. aarogyasri.telangana.gov.in
13. Shankar Prinja et al; Impact of Publicly Financed Health Insurance Schemes on
Healthcare Utilization and Financial Risk Protection in India: A Systematic Review
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0170996 ,February 2, 2017
14. Vian T. Review of corruption in the health sector: theory, methods and interventions.Health Policy Plan. 2008 Mar;23(2):83–94. doi: 10.1093/ heapol/czm048. Epub 2008
Feb 14.
15. Schönhöfer PS. Controlling corruption in order to improve global health. Int J Risk Saf
Med. 2004;16(3):195–205.
16. Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2006. London: Pluto Press;
2006.
17. Editorial. Corruption in health care costs lives. Lancet. 2006 Feb 11;367(9509):447.
18. United Nations Development Programme. Fighting corruption in the health sector –
methods, tools and good practices [Internet]. New York: United Nations
Development Programme; 2011Oct 31[cited 2013 Jul 4]. Available from:
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/ home/librarypage/democraticgovernance/anti-corruption/fighting_ corruptioninthehealthsector/
19. Chattopadhyay Subrata; Corruption in healthcare and medicine: Why should
physicians and bioethicists care and what should they do?, Indian Journal of Medical
Ethics Vol X No 3 July-September 2013
20. Dhruv Khullar Dana G. Safran Using behavioral economics in provider payment to
motivate improved quality, outcomes & cost: The Alternative Quality Contract
Healthcare 5 (2017) 6–8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.hjdsi.2016.04.010
21. Khullar D, et al. Behavioral economics and physician compensation–promise and
challenges. N Engl J Med. 2015;372(24):2281–2283.
22. Emanuel EJ, et al. Using behavioral economics to design physician incentives that
deliver high-value care. Ann Intern Med. 2016;164.2:114–119.
23. Cabinet Office and Behavioural Insights Team. Better Choices: Better Deals,
Behavioural Insights Team Paper. Cabinet Office-Behavioural Insights Team website.
http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/better-choices-better-deals.pdf
24. B.C. Madrian Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design
National Bureau of Economic Research; 2014, New York (2014), 10.3386/w20318
25. G.B. Chapman, M. Li, H. Colby, H. Yoon; Opting in vs opting out for Influenza
vaccination JAMA, 304 (1) (2010), pp. 43- 44, 10.
26. S. van der Linden, C. Clarke, E. Maibach Highlighting consensus among medical
scientists increases public support for vaccines: evidence from a randomized
experiment BMC Public Health, 15 (1) (2015), p. 1207, 10.1186/s12889-015-2541-4
27. R.H. Thaler, C.R. Sunstein Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and
Happiness Yale University Press, New Haven, CT (2008)
28. Pandey Kundan, Down To Earth; 10/02/2018, 02(43 15 August 2014
29. How India's Corrupt Healthcare System Is A Failure Of Policy, Not Doctors,
http://www.Youthkiawaaz.com 10/02/2018, 02(44)
30. www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/62794948.cms?utm_source=cont
entofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
31. http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php? g=202502&p=1335759), adopted by the 2nd
General Assembly of the World Medical Association, Geneva, Switzerland32. How Technology Can Limit India's Rampant Corruption, Forbes, JUL 9, 2012, 02(40)
33. Rajasekhar D, Berg E, Ghatak M, Manjula R, Roy S. Implementing health insurance:
the rollout of Rash- triya Swasthya Bima Yojana in Karnataka. Economic and Political
Weekly. 2011; 46(20):56–63.
34. Devadasan N, Seshadri T, Trivedi M, Criel B. Promoting universal financial protection:
evidence from the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in Gujarat, India. Health
Res Policy Syst. 2013; 11:29. doi: 10.1186/1478-4505-11-29 PMID: 23961956
35. Maeseneer J De, Moosa S, Pongsupap Y, Kaufman A. Primary health care in a
changing world. Br J Gen Pract. 2008; 58(556):806–9. doi: 10.3399/bjgp08X342697
PMID: 19000405
36. Prinja S, Bahuguna P, Gupta R, Sharma A, Rana SK, Kumar R. Coverage and Financial
Risk Protection for Institutional Delivery: How Universal Is Provision of Maternal
Health Care in India? PloS one. 2015; 10(9):e0137315. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0137315 PMID: 26348921
37. Prinja S, Kanavos P, Kumar R. Health Care Inequities in North India: Role of Public
Sector in Universal- izing Health Care.Indian J Med Research. 2012; 136: 145–55.
38. Sidak, J. Gregory; Teece, David J. (2009). "Dynamic Competition in Antitrust
Law". Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 5 (4): 581–631 [p.
604]. doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp024.
39. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness
Book by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler
Published
2018-12-31
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